Ukraine-Russia Conflict: Current Status and Its Impact on International Security
The Russia-Ukraine war(Ukraine-Russia Conflict) has been ongoing for approximately 1,150 days. Since its beginning on February 24, 2022, the conflict has now surpassed three years, with the tragic situation of numerous civilian casualties on both sides continuing. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the confirmed civilian death toll exceeded 10,000 by March 2025, though the actual figure is estimated to be much higher[1].
Ukraine’s Nuclear Security Controversy
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2024 report, while there have been some reports about Ukraine’s potential nuclear weapons development, these remain unconfirmed[2]. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regularly verifies that all nuclear facilities in Ukraine are being used exclusively for peaceful purposes[3].
During his election campaign, US President Donald Trump referred to Zelensky as “the greatest salesman in the world” and claimed he was “a person who receives $30 billion (approximately 80 trillion won) from Biden every time he visits the United States.” Since Trump’s inauguration as president (January 20, 2025), there have been changes to US military aid policy toward Ukraine. According to The Washington Post, while aid has been reduced, it has not been completely halted[4].
Ukraine’s Former Status as a Nuclear Power
According to materials from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Ukraine was the world’s third-largest nuclear power during the Soviet era[5]. When it gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine possessed 1,800 nuclear warheads and 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Research from Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs confirms that Ukraine could not effectively use these nuclear weapons[6].
The nuclear weapons in Ukraine at that time required launch codes located in the Kremlin in Moscow to be activated, meaning Ukraine did not have the ability to control these weapons. Therefore, the argument “if they had not given up their nuclear weapons” lacks practical substance.
The Budapest Memorandum
In 1994, Ukraine signed the ‘Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances’ with the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia. According to an analysis by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), this memorandum stated that in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons, the three major powers would respect Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and borders, and refrain from using force or economic threats against it[7].
Zelensky has criticized Russia’s invasion as a violation of this memorandum and has argued that the signatory countries are not adequately protecting Ukraine. According to Financial Times reporting, from late 2024 to early 2025, Ukraine made several statements suggesting the nullification of the Budapest Memorandum, though it has not officially declared intentions to develop nuclear weapons[8].
The Practical Possibility of Nuclear Weapons Development
According to research from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program, Ukraine may technically possess the capability to develop basic nuclear weapons[9]. Based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) database, Ukraine has 15 nuclear reactors, 9 of which are currently operational[10]. However, these reactors are primarily for power generation, and significant modifications would be required to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
BBC reporting indicates that the war has severely damaged Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, further diminishing the technical feasibility of nuclear weapons development[11].
According to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, the development and operation of nuclear weapons require enormous costs. The United States is expected to spend approximately 850-900 trillion won on nuclear weapons over the next decade[12]. Based on World Bank data, it is questionable whether Ukraine could bear such a financial burden[13].
The Authorization of ATACMS Missiles and Their Impact
According to Reuters, the United States began allowing limited use of ATACMS missiles from October 2023, with restrictions being partially eased in 2024[14]. The New York Times reports that since the Trump administration took office in early 2025, the supply of ATACMS has been significantly restricted[15].
According to statements from the US Department of Defense and South Korean Ministry of National Defense, information regarding North Korean troop deployment has been partially confirmed, but the scale and role remain under debate[16].
Analysis from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) indicates that in late 2024 and early 2025, Ukraine carried out several limited strikes on Russian territory, but achieved limited success due to Russia’s air defense systems[17].
Current Situation (As of April 2025)
According to analysis from the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Trump administration has attempted to mediate peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia since taking office in January 2025, but no substantive progress has been made yet[18].
The latest report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) indicates that in early 2025, Russia made additional advances on the eastern front, while Ukraine faces severe shortages of troops and equipment[19].
According to official statements from the European Commission, European countries are working to expand support for Ukraine to partially offset reduced American assistance[20].
Conclusion
According to materials from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, while Ukraine’s development of nuclear weapons may be technically possible, it is unlikely to be a realistic option considering the war situation, international pressure, and economic constraints[21]. The Russia-Ukraine war continues, and according to statements from the UN Secretary-General’s Office, efforts to find a diplomatic solution to end the war are ongoing, though no clear breakthrough has been achieved yet[22].
References
[1] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2025, March). “Civilian casualties in Ukraine conflict.” UN OHCHR Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.
[2] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2024). “SIPRI Yearbook 2024: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.”
[3] International Atomic Energy Agency. (2024, December). “Nuclear Safety and Security in Ukraine.”
[4] Washington Post. (2025, February 15). “Trump administration revises Ukraine military aid package.”
[5] International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2023). “The Military Balance 2023.”
[6] Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. (2022). “Ukraine’s Nuclear History and Security Assurances.”
[7] United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. (2022). “The Budapest Memorandum at 25: Lessons for Nuclear Non-proliferation.”
[8] Financial Times. (2025, January 10). “Ukraine questions validity of Budapest Memorandum amid Russian invasion.”
[9] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2024). “Nuclear Policy Program: Ukraine’s Technical Nuclear Capacity.”
[10] International Atomic Energy Agency. (2024). “Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) Database.”
[11] BBC News. (2025, March 5). “Ukraine’s energy infrastructure bears brunt of Russian attacks.”
[12] Congressional Research Service. (2024, October). “U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure.”
[13] World Bank. (2024). “Ukraine Economic Update.”
[14] Reuters. (2023, October 17). “U.S. allows Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles with limitations.”
[15] New York Times. (2025, February 22). “Trump administration restricts ATACMS supply to Ukraine.”
[16] U.S. Department of Defense & South Korean Ministry of National Defense. (2024, December). “Joint assessment on North Korean military involvement in Ukraine conflict.”
[17] Royal United Services Institute. (2025, March). “Ukraine’s Deep Strike Capabilities: An Assessment.”
[18] Economist Intelligence Unit. (2025, March). “Russia-Ukraine Peace Negotiations: Prospects and Challenges.”
[19] International Crisis Group. (2025, April). “Ukraine: The War in the East.”
[20] European Commission. (2025, March 12). “EU increases military and financial support for Ukraine.”
[21] Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. (2024). “Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Regime.”
[22] United Nations Secretary-General’s Office. (2025, April 1). “Statement on diplomatic efforts to end the conflict in Ukraine.”